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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE 
ELLEN HAYS, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT 
COMPANY OF OGDEN and 
NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND 
CASUALTY COMPANY, an 
Insurance Corporation, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
STATE OF UTAH 
— 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 — 
Case No. 14195 
— 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 — 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
This action was brought by ELLEN HAYS, Plaintiff-Appellant to recover 
as Beneficiary on a policy of life insurance on the life of her husband even 
though immediately prior to his death the policy had been surrendered by him as 
owner-insured for the cash values therein. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On Motion of Respondent, NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY for 
Summary Judgment based on admitted and uncontested facts, the Court as a matter 
of law dismissed the Plaintiff's Complaint (R.154-5). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY seeks the affir-
mance of the Judgment granted by the District Court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent, NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY considers the 
statement of facts contained in Appellant's Brief to be inaccurate, incomplete and 
inadequate and therefore elects to set forth the facts necessary to consideration 
of this case on appeal by this Court. 
MARVIN E. HAYS, was the husband of ELLEN HAYS, Plaintiff-Appellant herein 
(R. 4). By Application No. 265971 bearing date of April 9, 1965, MARVIN E. HAYS, 
at Ogden, Utah, applied to NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY through its agent, 
GAIL L. SALTUS, for the issuance of a policy of life insurance (R. 105 and 106). On 
the 8th day of July, 1965, NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY issued Policy 
No. L-939534 to MARVIN E. HAYS, who was then of the age of 45 years (R. 105). The 
initial sum of insurance or face value of the policy as of the date of issuance was 
$5,000.00 (R. 105). Certain other benefits were also applied for in connection with 
the policy (R. 105 and 106). Premiums were paid and the policy was continued in full 
force and effect, to just prior to March 21, 1972, when an inquiry was initiated by 
MARVIN E. HAYS through RON JENSEN of FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT COMPANY OF OGDEN to 
NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY as to adjusted cash value in the policy of 
life insurance hereinabove referred to (R. 99, 102 and 110). The company replied to 
HAYS in care of RON JENSEN, advising that the cash value was $283.13. The letter 
advising of the cash value stated, 
"We are enclosing Surrender Forms but urge that you con-
sider the suggestions on the reverse side of the form before pro-
ceeding with the surrender of your insurance" (R. 102). 
On the reverse side of the Application for Surrender are set forth seven suggestions 
urging the insured not to relinquish his insurance but to use other methods to raise 
funds and protect his insurance (R. 103). The policy of insurance carried this expres: 
provision, 
"The insured shall be the owner of this policy, unless 
otherwise provided. With the exception of the benefit payable 
at the death of the insured to the Beneficiary, the owner, sub-
ject to the rights of any assignee, shall have all rights, privi-
leges and benefits contained in this policy." (R. 23, Interroga-
tory No. 2, policy attached). 
- 3 -
There was no provision of the policy which limited MR. HAYS' rights as owner-
Insured. One of the "non-forfeiture benefits" of the policy was the right of 
the owner to surrender the policy at any time for its cash surrender value 
(R. 23, policy attached). Despite the admonition contained in the letter from 
the company under date of March 21, 1972 (R. 102), MARVIN E. HAYS elected to 
file with the company, a surrender of the policy for its cash value (R. 104). 
This surrender was duly signed at Ogden, Utah, according to its terms, on March 
24, 1972, and was witnessed by one RON JENSEN (R. 104). Plaintiff-Appellant 
admits that this action was taken by the insured as owner of the policy on March 
24, 1972 at approximately twelve o'clock noon (R. 99). Plaintiff further admits 
that thereafter and prior to his death, MARVIN E. HAYS did nothing to rescind 
the action which he had taken (R. 89, No. 5). The Application for the cash surren-
der value of the policy was put out of the control of the applicant and forwarded 
by mail to the insurance company by regular mail, March 24, 1972 (R. 75, No. 19). 
The insurance company received the Application for cash surrender value at its 
headquarters in Minneapolis, Minnesota, on March 27, 1972 (R. 51, No's. 16F and 6 
and 17). The Application was processed immediately and a check issued March 28, 
1972 (R. 16G, R. 112). On March 27, 1972, at approximately 10:30 A.M., the insured 
MARVIN E. HAYS, died at St. Benedicts Hospital in Ogden, Weber County, Utah (R. 100 
The check in the amount of $283.13 for the cash value of the policy was taken by 
the Plaintiff-Appellant herein and cashed (R. 89, R. 100). Though immaterial to 
the decision of the case, Plaintiff claims to have given notice to FIDELITY INDUS-
TRIAL CREDIT COMPANY OF OGDEN, at about noon on March 27, 1972, of the death of 
MARVIN E. HAYS, the insured (R. 99, 100). RON JENSEN of FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT 
COMPANY OF OGDEN claims to have notified the Respondent insurance company at its 
home office by telephone on the same date, March 27, 1972, at an unknown hour, of 
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the death of MARVIN E. HAYS (R. 75). The insurance company has been unable to 
locate any record of receipt of any such telephone call (R. 53, No. 26). Some 
three months after the Plaintiff had received and cashed the check of NORTH 
AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY for the cash surrender value of the policy 
issued to the insured, the Plaintiff retained the services of MR. VLAHOS to 
attempt to recover the face value of the insurance policy (R. 100, 101). Action 
was initially commenced by the Plaintiff as Administratrix of the Estate of MARVIN 
E. HAYS, by the filing of a Complaint in that capacity in the District Court of 
Weber County, State of Utah, dated the 17th day of December, 1972, and filed 
December 20, 1972 (R. 1-3). Ultimately the Complaint was amended to set forth the 
claim on behalf of the Plaintiff-Appellant as the Beneficiary of the policy of 
insurance (R. 60-62). It is in this capacity that Plaintiff proceeded with the 
lawsuit (R. 60-63). The foregoing are essential facts. Additional facts necessary 
to the consideration of the Plaintiff's claim of lack of opportunity for discovery 
will be set forth as needed in the argument. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S CONTENTION THAT ADEQUATE DISCOVERY 
WAS DENIED WAS NOT PRESENTED TO THE LOWER COURT, IS WITHOUT 
MERIT AND CANNOT SERVE AS A BASIS FOR REVERSAL OF THE COURT BELOW 
Even a cursory examination of the record discloses the lack of validity 
to the claim asserted at this date by Plaintiff-Appellant that she was denied her 
right of adequate discovery. The case was pending from December 20, 1972 (R. 1) 
until its ultimate decision by the HONORABLE JOHN F. WALQUIST by memorandum deci-
sion made and entered the 30th day of June, 1975, a space of two and one-half years 
in which Plaintiff-Appellant made no effort at the discovery which Appellant now 
claims was denied to it. Despite the fact that the relationship of NORTH AMERICAN 
LIFE AND CASUALTY and FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT COMPANY OF OGDEN is totally immate 
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rial to the decision of the Court in this matter, as will be more fully shown in 
the discussion of the merits of this cause under POINT II of this Brief, neither 
NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY nor FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT COMPANY 
OF OGDEN have failed to respond appropriately as determined by the lower Court 
to the discovery directed to either NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY or 
to FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT COMPANY OF OGDEN (R. 22-34, 43, 44, 46-55, 74,75). 
At pages 5 and 6 of the Appellant's Brief, Appellant implies that the NORTH AMERICAI 
LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY had refused to furnish the details of the insurance polii 
issued by that company upon the life of MARVIN E. HAYS. The Appellant states that 
"the Respondent attached an insurance form in blank 
without setting forth therein any of the information contained 
in the original policy and without any of the items of speci-
ficity desired by the Appellant, such as the amount of the 
policy, provisions for additional benefits, the named Bene-
ficiary, the name of the agent or agents subscribing to the 
policy of insurance". 
Appellant neglects to advise the Court that in Open Court on the occasion of the 
appearance before the HONORABLE RONALD 0. HYDE, JUDGE, on the 3rd day of July, 1973 
on the Defendant NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY'S objections to the Inter 
rogatories of the Plaintiff, Defendant-Respondent's attorney presented to the 
attorney for the Plaintiff the details requested in the form of a reproduced copy o 
the actual application and of the face of the actual policy. That the details of 
the policy requested by Plaintiff were furnished to the Plaintiff is admitted in 
the Motion and Notice to Amend Complaint filed by MR. VLAHOS on behalf of his clienl 
under date of December 11, 1973, wherein he states:-
"Subsequent to the filing of the Complaint herein and 
following discovery of the terms of the insurance policy, the 
Plaintiff believes that the real party in interest is Ellen 
Hays individually instead of as Administratrix of the Estate " 
of Marvin E. Hays, and therefore, desires to file an Amended 
Complaint to show the proper party in interest herein. 
This Motion is based upon the pleadings, papers, records, 
and files In this action". (R. 63) (Emphasis ours) 
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These details were again supplied in the Respondent's narrative statement of facts 
dated January 17, 1975, and filed by the Court January 23, 1975 (R. 105-107). In 
view of the fact that the matter of the Plaintiff's Interrogatories and the objec-
tions thereto by the Defendant-Respondent, NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, 
were ruled upon by the Court, it would seem that if Plaintiff claimed any error 
by the Court in the ruling so made, an appeal should be prosecuted from the decision 
of the Court made and entered by the HONORABLE RONALD 0. HYDE on July 12, 1973 
(R. 43,44). No such appeal has been taken nordoes Plaintiff-Appellant designate 
any part of this appellate procedure as having been taken from that ruling. It 
should also be noted that amended answers to the Interrogatories of Plaintiff were 
filed setting forth all of the information ordered by the Court, under oath, served 
on Plaintiff by mail October 16, 1973 and filed October 17, 1973 (R. 46-54). No 
exception was noted, no objections were made by the Plaintiff-Appellant personally 
to counsel or formally with the Court to the answers of Defendant. No further 
Interrogatories or demands were made or directed to Defendant, NORTH AMERICAN 
LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, nor were any deficiencies in the response pointed out 
in either further pleadings by Plaintiff or otherwise until the filing of the 
Appellant's Brief in this action. Under date of January 10, 1975, attorney for the 
Plaintiff-Appellant set forth in a communication directed to the HONORABLE JOHN 
F. WALQUIST to ALLEN H. TIBBALS and to CARL T. SMITH as counsel for the respective 
Respondents, a statement that: 
"however depositions are going to be set in connection 
with the one employee at Fidelity Industrial Credit of Ogden 
and also Mr. Gail T. Saltus of Salt Lake City, Utah". (R. 99-
101 at 101) 
* . • ' , • • • ' ••' • . • • • • • . 
Initially by telephone to PETE VLAHOS, confirmed by letter dated January 8, 1975 
to both VLAHOS and CARL T. SMITH and ultimately included in the narrative statement 
of facts supplied by NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY in compliance with 
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the Order of the Court and mailed as shown by the mailing certificate attached 
thereto to the attorney for the Plaintiff-Appellant, the full name and address 
of GAIL L. SALTUS was set forth where he could be reached both as to his residence 
and as to his business at that date (R. 105-108 at 106). After the filing of 
the narrative statements above referred to, Respondent waited for an additional 
four months before petitioning the Court for a Summary Judgment in the matter. No 
Depositions were ever scheduled by Plaintiff. The Motion for Summary Judgment was 
duly served upon the attorney for the Plaintiff by mail on the 9th day of May, 
1975, as shown by the amended Certificate of Mailing (R. 113). No objection to th 
Motion, no Petition for any relief seeking the opportunity for further discovery 
was ever filed by Plaintiff nor were any Affidavits or other statements made con-
troverting any of the facts or indicating the existence of a factual issue to be 
decided by the Court beyond the scope of the admitted facts before it. At the 
hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court after the oral argument and 
the presentation of a written Brief at the hearing by Defendant, NORTH AMERICAN 
LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY specifically allowed time for the filing of a response 
in writing by Plaintiff, and took the Motion under advisement (R. 117). No Brief 
was submitted by Plaintiff (R. 148). It should be noted that the Court waited 
until the 30th day of June, 1975 before proceeding further by the entry of its 
memorandum decision (R. 148, 149). After the issuance of the memorandum decision 
(R. 148, 149), Respondent prepared and served Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and a Decree (R. 150, 155). No Motion for new trial or to set aside the Find-
ings, Conclusions of Law and Judgment or other appeal for relief to the lower Court 
was ever made by the Appellant in this matter (R. 148). 
The multitude of authority cited by Appellant in support of the right of 
discovery are needless. No one has denied to the Appellant the right of discovery, 
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Appellant simply did not exercise the right and it does not become the duty of 
the Respondent or of the Court to conduct the discovery for the Plaintiff-Appellant. 
We do not quarrel with the authorities cited by Appellant, they are simply inappli-
cable to the factual situation in this case as disclosed by the record. This 
matter may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Appellant did not afford 
the lower Court any opportunity to rule upon or consider any claim by Appellant 
that any right of discovery was being denied by that Court. In the case of CLAASEN 
vs. FARMER'S GRAIN COOPERATIVE., 208 Kansas 129,490 P.2d 376, the Court under similar 
circumstances said:-
"Syllabus by the Court 
1. A party against whom a motion for summary judgment 
is sustained cannot object on appeal to the action of the 
trial court in hearing and acting on the motion when the record 
discloses that he introduced no evidence at the hearing on the 
motion for summary judgment, did not object thereto, and did not 
request time to make further discovery.11 
******** 
"(1) Plaintiff first claims error in that the trial court 
sustained the defendant's motion for summary judgment without a 
, pretrial conference or without permitting plaintiff to produce 
evidence refuting the testimony of defendant's witnesses. The 
record does not disclose that plaintiff objected to the hearing 
on the motion for summary judgment or asked for time to make 
further discovery. The plaintiff cannot now object to the ruling 
of the trial court. (Bicknell v. Jones, 203 Kan. 196, 453 P.2d 
127.)" 
We respectfully submit that Appellant's contention is without merit. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS NO ENFORCEABLE CLAIM TO 
DEATH BENEFITS AGAINST THE DEFENDANT, NORTH AMERICAN LIFE 
AND CASUALTY COMPANY UNDER THE POLICY SURRENDERED BY THE 
OWNER-INSURED PRIOR TO HIS DEATH FOR THE CASH SURRENDER 
VALUE AS A NON-FORFEITABLE BENEFIT UNDER THE POLICY 
Plaintiff-Appellant's claim arouses the sympathy of anyone to whom the 
facts may be presented. By a cruel quirk of fate the husband of the Plaintiff, 
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MARVIN E. HAYS, was called by death within three days after having exercised an 
election to surrender the insurance policy on his life, of which he was the owner, 
to NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY for its cash surrender value, thereby 
depriving the Plaintiff as Beneficiary of death benefits otherwise payable under 
the policy. The situation is sad but there is no legal basis upon which the 
Defendant-Respondent, NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY can pay out the dea 
benefits under the policy to this Plaintiff. For reasons best known to himself, 
MARVIN E. HAYS, husband of the Plaintiff-Appellant, ELLEN HAYS, decided to give 
up the policy which he had carried with NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY 
since 1965 and accept the cash benefit under the policy as was his non-forfeitable 
privilege. He initiated the steps in connection with this matter through FIDELITY 
INDUSTRIAL CREDIT COMPANY OF OGDEN. He went to that company and requested that thi 
ascertain what the cash benefits were on this policy (R. 26, 15D). NORTH AMERICAN 
LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY responded to this request for information by forwarding 
to MR. HAYS, in care of RON JENSEN of FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT COMPANY OF OGDEN, 
a letter dated March 21, 1972, setting forth the cash surrender value of the policj 
and specifically urging that MR. HAYS consider the suggestions on the reverse side 
of the form which was enclosed before proceeding with the surrender of his insur-
ance (R. 102, 103). MR. HAYS, nevertheless concluded that he desired to have the 
cash values in the policy and did execute in the presence of RON JENSEN, a form, 
"Surrender of Policy for Cash Value" (R. 104) on the 24th day of March, 1972 (R. 104 
R. 71, 75, Interrogatories 17, 18 and 19 and responses thereto). Having executed 
the Application for the surrender of the policy for cash value, MR. HAYS, then 
turned the same over to RON JENSEN of FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT COMPANY OF OGDEN 
to forward the same to NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY. MR. JENSEN prompt 
carried out the wishes of MR. HAYS and did forward the Application to NORTH AMERICA 
LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY on March 24, 1972, by regular mail (R. 75, Interrogatory 
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19 and answer thereto). NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY actually received 
the Application for the cash surrender value of the policy on March 27, 1972 (R. 51, 
Interrogatory 16, answer sub-paragraph f and No. 17). The form was promptly pro-
cessed by the company and a check in the amount of $283.13, payable to the insured, 
was issued (R. 51, Interrogatory 16, sub-paragraph g, R. 112 and R. 100). The 
Plaintiff-Appellant took the check and negotiated the same (R. 100). The right which 
the owner-insured, MARVIN E. HAYS, exercised under the policy was a non-forfeitable 
right (R. 23, policy attached thereto, non-forfeiture benefits). The exact language 
of the policy is as follows: 
"NON-FORFEITURE BENEFITS 
Cash Surrender Value- The owner may surrender this policy 
at any time for its Cash Surrender Value, which will be the Cash 
Value obtained from the table of Non-forfeiture Values less any 
indebtedness. Values at interim points in a policy year will be 
calculated with due allowance for fractional premiums paid and 
time elapsed since the last anniversary, provided, however, that 
the Cash Value within 60 days of the due date of an unpaid pre-
mium shall be the same as on such due date". 
The Beneficiary under the policy of insurance issued on the life of 
MARVIN E. HAYS, had no rights under the policy nor is she granted any by Utah Law 
with respect to the exercise of these non-forfeitable rights. The policy is specific, 
"with the exception of the benefit payable at the death of the insured to the Bene-
ficiary, the owner, subject to the rights of any assignee, shall have all right, 
privileges and benefits contained in this policy" (R. 30, copy of policy attached). 
There seems to be no conflict in the law with regard to the rights of the insured 
under such policy. COUCH ON INSURANCE, 2d Ed., §32; 183. On the subject matter 
"Exercise of Option as Acceptance of an Offer", at page 412, while recognizing that 
there is some conflict in language of the cases on this subject matter and some 
analyses have been made which do not give appropriate effect to the language in its 
ordinary contract sense, the authority concludes; 
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"it is,however, generally and properly held that the 
insurer has no choice in the matter but is bound by the terms 
of its contract, and assuming the conditions to election have 
been satisfied, cannot refuse to give the election full effect. 
***The better analysis of the problem is undoubtedly to hold 
that the option is the same as any other option contract, namely, 
that is the insurer who stands as offeror with no freedom of 
choice once the offeree-optionee, here the insured, chooses to 
exercise his option. In accordance with this view, it is held 
that the right or option under a life insurance policy to sur-
render the policy and accept its cash surrender value, consti-
tutes a continuing offer on the part of the insurer which, 
when accepted by the insured through the exercise of such right 
or option, fixes the rights of the party without further action 
on the part of the insurer. Similarly, it is held that an option 
contained in a policy whereby the insured may surrender it for its 
cash value is an offer from the insurer to the insured which it 
is his right to accept in accordance with provisions of the policy 
as to time, and other details, and if he does so the contract is 
complete and the insurer has no right to accept or reject his 
election to take the cash surrender value; that is, its obligation 
is absolute, subject to such provisions as may exist as to the 
time of making the payment*** As a further application of these 
principles it has been held that if actual receipt of the election 
is not required, there is an effective election where the notice 
of the insured is mailed to the insurer, and that the mailing of 
a letter electing to take the surrender value precludes recovery 
for subsequent death, although the check for the amount of the 
surrender value was not received until later*** Statements to the 
effect that an election of a non-forfeiture clause contemplates 
a meeting of minds on the matter agreed upon should not be inter-
preted as indicating that the insured is making an offer which must 
be accepted by the insurer, for the agreement of the parties is to 
be found in the fact that the insurer had made the offer of the 
options one of which was then accepted by the election of the insured. 
The fact that the insurer has not performed in accordance 
with the option after the election of the insured has been properly 
communicated to it, does not establish that the exercise of the 
option is not binding upon it, but only that it has failed to per-
form its contract according to its terms and that it may therefore 
be liable for damages for its breach. 
§ 32:184. *****When the insurer has "accepted" the election 
of the insured the latter may no longer revoke his election, not 
because the election was an offer which the insurer could reject 
but because the act of "acceptance" definitively establishes that 
the acceptance by the insured of the option-offer was communicated 
to the insurer and thus became binding on both parties." 
In the Kansas City Missouri case of PACK vs. PROGRESSIVE LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 187 SW 2d 501, decided in the Missouri Court of Appeals, March 5, 1945, 
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while the factual situation is not parallel to the instant case and involves many 
complicated factors which are irrelevant to consideration here, it remains that the 
insured in that case elected to take the cash value out of the policies which he 
had with the Defendant company, the company defended against a claim for the death 
benefits, and the Court concluded: 
"The privilege exercised, the option of surrendering 
the policies for their cash value was won, bought and paid 
for by the insured; such option is an offer contained in the 
policy contract and is from the company to the insured, and 
it is his right to accept the offer, within a specified time, 
and his acceptance completes the contract; the company has no 
right to accept or reject; its obligation to pay is absolute. 
In this case the only limitation is that, as the policy pro-
vided, the insurance company may defer such payment for a 
period not exceeding six months but that cannot effect fixed 
liability.'1 
It should be noted that in this case 0. E. Pack, the insured, died on June 17, 1936. 
Up to that date, the company had still not paid the amount of the cash value of the 
policies though it had recognized in writing its obligation to do so but insisted 
that it had the right under the policy to defer the payment for six months and then 
it failed to act. Mr. Pack having died, the Beneficiary brought suit seeking to 
recover the full amount due under the policies rather than the cash surrender value. 
The Court held that having exercised the right that the liabilities became fixed 
and the death of Mr. Pack did not change this or give the Beneficiary any increased 
rights, and the Court held: 
"we conclude that the admitted and undisputed evidence 
compels but one conclusion, and that is, that the insured 
definitely elected to take the cash surrender value of the 
policies at a time when he had a right to make such an election, 
and that such an election made a binding contract between the 
insured and the defendant. The fact that the defendant did not 
pay the cash value in accordance with the policies may be morally 
reprehensible, but in law it is a breach of contract. It is 
unnecessary to discuss the other questions raised." 
In the instant case the company promptly paid the cash values of the policy which 
were accepted by Plaintiff (R. 112, 100). The Plaintiff admits that the insured did 
not at any time take any action to reverse the action which he had taken of submitting 
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the policy to the company for the cash surrender value (R, 89, Demand for Admissioi 
No. 5 and response thereto). In the case of PACIFIC STATES LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
vs. BRYCE, decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuitf 67 Fed. 
2d 710, the facts were that the policy was issued upon the life of Charles W. Bryc< 
who died March 28, 1932. The Plaintiff in that action was his widow and Beneficial 
of the insurance policy. The policy provided" 
"all the rights and benefits accruing hereunder to the 
insured are vested in said insured without consent of any Bene-
ficiary unless otherwise provided by the insured or expressly 
prohibited by statute". 
On January 18, 1932, the insured mailed the policy to the company with a statement 
that he would like to cash it in on February 3rd, the next premium date. On Januai 
29th, the company called his attention to the fact that if the cash were withdrawn 
his insurance would be gone and suggested that he borrow on the policy instead. 
On February 3rd, the insured expressed his appreciation of the interest shown by 
the company, but adhered to his decision to cash in the policy. The company then 
mailed to him on February 9th,the form of agreement which recites, 
"the sole owners of policy No. 8549*** have this day 
surrendered said policy in consideration of its cash value 
which at this time amounts to $585.00, and said parties hereby 
acknowledge receipt of $585.00 in consideration of which the 
agreed or released said Pacific States Life Insurance for all 
further liabilities under policy No. 8549. This agreement was 
executed by the insured and also the Plaintiff (the beneficiary 
under the policy) although she was neither an assignee nor an 
irrevocably named beneficiary. On February 24th the company 
acknowledged receipt of the surrender agreement and advised 
by reason of conjestion in its loan department some delay would 
ensue in remitting the cash, but the check would go forward as 
soon as the application was reached in its turn. The insured took 
no further steps in the matter. After his death on March 28th, 
the company mailed a check for the surrender value on April 8th, 
which the parties stipulate was as soon as cash was available 
therefore and in its proper turn, and the policy was endorsed, 
cash surrender, April 8, 1932. Demand was made for payment of 
the face amount of the policy and refused and the suit there-
fore followed.***" 
The Court held, 
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***
H0n the contrary, by his silence he acquiesced in 
the delay occasioned by the deluge of applications for sur-
render values. Nor are we presented with the question of 
whether a rescission could be had after the death of the 
insured had radically changed the situation as it existed 
when the contract was made. If there ever was a right to 
rescind the contract by which the insured became entitled to 
the surrender value, it was not one which could be exercised 
by the beneficiary of the surrendered policy. Upon the death 
of the insured there passed to his estate a claim of $435.00 
against the insurance company. His personal representative, * 
his heirs, his creditors cannot be deprived of this chose 
in action by one who was the beneficiary in a surrendered 
life insurance policy. If the administrator of his estate 
sued for the $435.00, the company could not defend upon the 
ground that the beneficiary elected that it should not pay it. 
Whatever may be the true rule as to the right of a beneficiary 
to exercise an option afforded by an insurance contract which 
the insured had not exercised in his lifetime, certainly one 
who once was a beneficiary in a surrendered insurance policy 
has no right to rescind a contract by which the insured con-
verted an agreement to pay a larger sum upon death into an 
agreement to pay a smaller sum now.***" 
The Supreme Court of Utah has previously considered a parallel case in the case of 
DECKER vs. NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, decided February 21, 1938, 94 Utah 166; 
76 P.2d 568. The case was twice before this Court. In the initial instance the 
Court considered the matter upon appeal from a judgment in favor of the Plaintiff. 
The judgment was in the amount of $3,220.00 in favor of Plaintiff who was awarded 
judgment for the proceeds of a policy upon the life of her deceased husband, Feramorz 
Decker. The facts were that Feramorz Decker, husband of the Plaintiff, had taken 
out a policy of life insurance with the Defendant for $5,000.00 executed on June 
7, 1922. His wife was named Beneficiary. Decker failed to pay the quarterly premium 
due September 1, 1935 and on October 26, 1935, he delivered the policy to and requested 
the Defendant insurance company to pay to him the cash surrender value. The cash 
surrender value as of September 1, 1935, was $660.00, but there was an indebtedness 
of $407.48 against the policy. Decker died on November 3, 1935, eight days after 
delivery of the policy and before the Defendant had paid to Decker the net surrender 
value of $252.52. The facts as thus set forth were admitted by the pleadings. The 
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Plaintiff, the Beneficiary under the policy, sued for the $3,000.00 face value 
of the policy remitting any allowance over the amount of $3,000.00 in order to 
keep the matter in State Court. The Plaintiff claimed that the insurance was in 
full force as of the date of the death of the insured subject only to the amount 
of the loans. There was no dispute that the policy provisions provided that after 
three full years of premiums having been paid, the insured at the end of any insur-
ance year or within three months after any default in payment of a premium but not 
later, might surrender the policy and receive its cash surrender value. The Plain-
tiff advanced many theories in support of her contention, each of which was careful' 
considered and disposed of by the Court. Some of the points considered have no 
relevance because of the different factual situation but on the point which is prec 
parallel to this case the reasoning of the Court as outlined in the DECKER decisior 
is quoted as follows: 
"It will be noted from the policy that the option to 
surrender and receive the cash surrender value is one which 
can be exercised irrespective of the assent of the insurance 
company. It is not governed by the rule of sale which holds 
that where goods are sold for cash title will not be considered 
as having passed until the cash is paid. While the policy 
states that the 'Insured may * * * surrender the policy, and 
(1) Receive its cash surrender value,1 it does not say that he 
should receive it contemporaneously. It is difficult to see 
how the company could write several alternatives for the sur-
render of the policy without putting in the words, 'Receive 
its cash surrender value.1 Respondent contends that if delivery 
of the policy and the reception of cash were not to be simul-
taneous but the company was to have time after delivery of the 
policy to pay the surrender value, it should have so stipulated. 
Perhaps the insured might have insisted on a contemporaneous 
transaction, but the fact is that he did not do so. He sent 
the policy in with a request for the net due to him from his 
reserve. This was an unequivocal election to terminate the 
policy and accept its cash surrender value less his indebted-
ness. Only eight days passed between this act and his death, 
not an unreasonable time in which to put the policy through the 
processes of audit and to return the cash. But if it were 
contemplated that the insured might demand payment of the sur-
render value contemporaneous with the delivery of the policy, 
he did not require it. He made his election. It is unfortu-
nate that he did so in view of his unexpected demise so soon 
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thereafter. But that fact cannot affect the election. He 
gave up his policy, made his election to take the cash sur-
render value, and the company could do nothing else than to 
send it to him or his personal representative. It had no 
choice. He or his representative could enforce the duty by 
suit. Whether the election might be recalled for failure to 
pay or tender within a reasonable time is not involved in this 
suit. 
In the case of Pacific States Life Ins. Co. v. Bryce, 
67 F.2d 710, 711, 91 A.L.R. 1446, written by Judge McDermott 
of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the facts were sub-
stantially as in the case at bar. They appear from the quoted 
portion of that decision. The court said: 
'The pleadings tender the simple issue as to whether the 
policy was effectively surrendered prior to the death of the 
insured. The facts are stipulated. A net reserve of $435.00 
had accumulated on this policy by February 3, 1932, the premium 
paying date. The policy accorded the insured three elections 
as to this reserve: It could (1) be withdrawn in cash, or (2) 
used to purchse a paid-up policy for a reduced amount, or (3) 
used to purchase extended insurance for the face of the policy 
for a limited term. In the absence of such election, feature 
(3) became automatic. * * *. . 
'On January 18 (1933) the insured mailed the policy to the 
company with the statement that he would like to cash it in on 
February 3 (1933), the next premium date. * * * The company then 
mailed him, on February 9, a form of agreement which recites that 
the 'sole owners of Policy No. 8549 * * * have this day surrendered 
said Policy in consideration of its cash value, which at this time 
amounts to Five Hundred Eighty-five and no/100 Dollars.1 * * * 
'This agreement was executed by the insured and also the 
plaintiff, although she was neither an assignee nor an irrevocably 
named beneficiary. On February 24, the company acknowledged receipt 
of the surrender agreement and advised that by reason of the conges-
tion in its Loan Department, some delay would ensue in remitting 
the cash, but that check would go forward as soon as the application 
was reached in its turn. 
'The insured took no further steps in the matter. After his 
death on March 28, the company mailed a check for the surrender 
value on April 8. * * * Demand was made for the payment of the face 
of the policy, refused, and this suit followed. * * * 
'Plaintiff's theory, adopted by the trial court, is that the 
execution of the surrender agreement was an offer by the insured to 
the company to surrender the policy for a cash payment of $435.00; 
that such offer lapsed and the surrender agreement voided because 
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the surrender value was not paid within a reasonable time or 
before the death of the insured. 
'With this construction of the policy contract we are 
not in accord. It puts the cart before the horse. The policy 
vested in the insured certain definite rights, among them the 
right to be paid the reserve on his policy in cash upon a sur-
render of his policy, if demanded within a specified time. The 
insured did demand the surrender value within the prescribed 
time, and surrendered his policy. When he did so-a month before 
his death-he became absolutely entitled to payment in cash of 
$435.00. Upon his death his estate, and not his beneficiary 
became entitled to that sum. The offer is contained in the 
policy contract, and is from the company to the insured; the 
option is in the insured and not the company, and his acceptance 
completes the contract; the company has no right to accept or 
reject; its obligation to pay is absolute. Under plaintiff's 
theory, an insured may only offer to surrender his policy for 
its cash value; the company may then accept or reject the offer, 
and if it fails to pay as agreed, the offer lapses. Such a 
construction would wipe out the right of an insured to the cash 
surrender value of his policy, because the company could defeat 
his right by rejecting his offer, or by failing to pay. To con-
strue an exercise of an option as an offer to the company, sub-
ject to rejection or lapse, would be to warp the plain terms of 
the contract and to deny the insured a right he has paid for. 
If Bryce, on March 15, had sued the company for $435.00, could 
the company have defended on the ground that it had not accepted 
his offer to take the cash surrender value? Clearly not; yet 
plaintiff's contention comes down to that.' 
Respondent both criticizes this case and attempts to dis-
tinguish it from the one at bar. The criticism is hurled at the 
ground for the decision mentioned in the Bryce Case, i.e., that 
there was a continuous irrevocable offer on the part of the insurer 
to pay the cash surrender value upon delivery of the policy, and 
that insured's acceptance completed the contract. We have no dis-
position to battle for this conception. It seems sufficient to us 
to hold that by the contract the insured had a right to elect to 
surrender the policy and receive the net surrender value and that 
the transactions of delivery or surrender and reception of the money 
were not required to be contemporaneous, at least if he did not 
insist upon it. We think the Bryce Case correctly decided on 
the principle that the surrender by the insured was complete when he 
delivered the policy to the insurance company with request for pay-
ment of its cash surrender value." 
Since the case on its original hearing before the Court had come there on demurer, 
and since the pleadings had raised issues of fact not fully decided, the Court reti 
the case for further action. It was again presented on further appeal after the 
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trial on the merits in August of 1939, 97 Utah 453, 93 P.2d 689. The factual 
situation with regard to the surrender of the policy was discussed at length but 
the provisions and the discussion are not particularly helpful to the decision in 
this case because the policy was delivered to the office of the insurance company by 
putting the same through a mail slot in the door, no one was present, the policy 
was found by someone who entered the building, the question was whether there was 
fraud involved in connection with the transaction. After having considered the 
various factual elements the Court reiterated its opinion at Page 693 of the Pacific 
Report, 
"the exercise of either of the options become effective 
from the time exercised. No meeting of minds is required to 
entitle the insured to the option selected by him. The election 
to take the cash surrendered value was one over which the insurer 
had no control. The request for the cash surrender value was made 
and was not recalled.*** 
There was no substantial evidence when considered with 
the pleadings upon which the jury could have found for the 
plaintiff. Under the allegations and proof, all reasonable men 
would conclude that the insured had signed and sent on its way 
the cash surrender request and that during the lifetime of the 
insured it had not been recalled. Under such circumstances, a 
directed verdict for the defendant was proper.***" 
In a \/ery recent annotation on this subject appearing in 15 ALR 3rd at 
page 1317, the annotating authority discusses, 
"Insured's Exercise of Election Afforded Under Life Insur-
ance Policy as Affected By His Death Before Complete Consumation 
of Option." 
The annotating authority says, Page 1319, Sec. 1. Introduction, 
"This annotation collects the cases which are concerned 
with the question whether an insuredfs death prevents his par-
tially consummated election afforded under a life insurance 
policy from being legally effective. *** 
II. GENERAL RULES 
Sec. 3. Continuing-offer rule (page 1321) 
Ample authority supports the fundamental rule that an 
option contained in a l i f e insurance policy is a continuing 
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and irrevocable offer which becomes a binding contract when 
accepted by the insured, the subsequent death of the insured 
being irrelevant to the effectiveness of the election." (Citing 
many cases including Pacific States Life Ins. Co. v. Bryce -
supra and Decker v. New York Life Ins. Co. supra.) (Emphasis ours) 
The authorities cited by the Plaintiff-Appellant to the effect that the 
Beneficiary has a vested interest in the policy and that the policy could not be 
surrendered without the consent of the Beneficiary are not pertinent inasmuch as th< 
contract provisions made it clear in the instant case that the insured enjoyed all 
rights under the policy. 
There is no statutory provision in this state which requires the consent 
of the Beneficiary to the taking of any action which the insured reserves to himsel 
under the policy. The legislature of the State of Utah has not been silent upon th 
matter of non-forfeitable rights under an insurance policy and has enacted 31-22-13 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 as Amended by Laws of Utah 1963, Chapter 45, Section 2, an 
Laws of Utah 1973, Chapter 49, Section 7, wherein the provisions of a policy with 
regard to non-forfeitable rights are statutorily commanded. But in so doing, the 
Legislature has not made any provision which requires that a Beneficiary be consult 
in the exercise by the insured of these non-forfeitable rights. It should be noted 
that MRS. HAYS was aware her husband had surrendered the policy on the day that he 
did so (R. 100). Nothing was done by her or her husband in regard to the matter 
until after his unexpected death three days later (R. 100). The law is clearthat 
MARVIN E. HAYS, having exercisedhis non-forfeitable right under the policy of insur 
ance to the cash surrender value of the policy which action he did not rescind duri 
his lifetime had effectually determined the amount to be paid under the policy. Th 
amount was paid and the Plaintiff has had the benefit thereof by her own admission 
(R. 100). 
The relationship between NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, if any 
with FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT COMPANY OF 0GDEN, is immaterial to the decision of 
- 20 -
this case. No right of the insured or of the Plaintiff is dependent upon any action 
which was taken by FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT COMPANY OF OGDEN. Neither FIDELITY 
INDUSTRIAL CREDIT COMPANY OF OGDEN nor anyone else could act to annul the action 
of the insured in exercising his prerogative to accept the cash benefits under the 
policy. Consequently the question of whether FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT COMPANY OF 
OGDEN did or did not call the insurance company to advise them of the death of MR. 
HAYS has no bearing on the Court's decision. The insured had acted, he did not 
retract the action during his lifetime. Any default by FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT 
:0MPANY OF OGDEN in carrying out MRS. HAYS' instruction to notify the insurance 
:arrier of the death of MR. HAYS can have no affect upon the outcome of the case if, 
n fact, such a default took place. The question of whether or not the policy was 
fritten through FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT COMPANY OF OGDEN or whether it was the 
roper agency to pay premiums to and other miscellaneous issues implied or suggested 
y the Plaintiff's Complaint and Interrogatories are equally immaterial, for under 
he factual situation here admitted, nothing hinges upon the performance of FIDELITY 
VDUSTRIAL CREDIT COMPANY OF OGDEN or its relationship to NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND 
\SUALTY COMPANY. 
CONCLUSION 
The Judgment should be affirmed. 
rt> 
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